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S u m m a r y
Papua New Guinea (PNG) must adjust to lower liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil prices to avoid a crisis. 
The PNG LNG project is still extremely important for the country, but because of lower prices many 
of the benefits of the production phase of the project have vanished – probably for at least a decade. 
Adjustments are urgently required in fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies to adapt to the 
changed realities.
K e y  p o i n t S
• World oil prices are now more than 35 per cent lower than at the time of the 2015 budget. This will 
have a direct impact on LNG revenues, since LNG prices are directly linked to oil prices.
• The fall in LNG and oil prices will reduce government revenue by over K1.4 billion in 2015 – more than 
10 per cent of all revenue. Revenues in 2016 are now K2.5 billion less than expected at the time of the 
2014 budget.
• PNG’s expected growth rate for 2015 is now 6.9 per cent, still good but far below the budget forecast 
of 15.5 per cent.
• Unless the Kina is re-floated and allowed to depreciate, PNG’s international reserves will fall by the end 
of 2015 to cover just over three months of imports. Reserves would keep falling and be exhausted by 
early 2017 as the balance of payments would stay in deficit.
• Without adjustment, PNG’s budget deficit in 2015 will increase to 8.8 per cent. On realistic expenditure 
assumptions, the deficit will continue rising to well over 10 per cent. The debt to GDP ratio will increase 
to 75 per cent by 2017 – two and half times the maximum level in the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
The development Policy centre is part of crawford School of Public Policy at  
The Australian National University. We undertake analysis and promote discussion on 
Australian aid, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific and global development policy.
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Papua New Guinea’s vanishing lNG export boom
i N T r o d U c T i o N
The PNG lNG project has been transformative 
for PNG during its construction phase. many 
jobs were created, both direct and indirect, by 
this massive $US19 billion project. The project 
has now moved into its production and export 
phase, where the benefits were to come from 
tax and dividend revenues and foreign exchange 
earnings. Given recent falls in lNG and oil prices, 
these benefits are now likely to be much reduced, 
at least for the next decade. 
The recent sharp fall in oil prices of over 
35 per cent is a major challenge for PNG, 
especially because the price of its lNG exports 
is determined by the international oil price. This 
policy brief outlines the impact of the recent 
fall in oil prices on PNG’s budget, growth rates, 
and balance of payments and international 
reserves. The broad conclusions are that: there 
will be no tax revenue from the PNG lNG project 
for many years; without expenditure restraint 
or increased taxes, deficit and debt levels will 
become even more unsustainable; the 2015 GdP 
growth rate will more than halve; the balance of 
payments will be in overall deficit even with the 
PNG lNG project coming to full capacity in 2016; 
and, without a depreciation, PNG’s international 
reserves will be exhausted in two years.
Given the real risk of crisis, the PNG 
government should urgently take steps to deal 
with the commodity price shock. At the end of its 
financial year for 2014, it should not spend any 
extra money, but instead pocket any savings from 
unspent allocations. in the face of such a large 
shock, there is a need for an urgent public debate 
in PNG on alternative policy responses, including 
on how the 2015 budget should be rewritten 
to avoid a spiralling deficit. PNG also needs to 
move back to a market-based exchange rate to 
provide a “shock absorber” for the economy, and 
find better ways to fund the deficit than printing 
money.
The analysis following is rather technical. 
An accompanying spreadsheet showing the 
underlying calculations is available. The analysis 
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uses PNG government numbers for fiscal policy 
and GdP growth forecasts. for external balance 
of payments and international reserves, it uses 
figures from the latest IMF Article IV report on 
the PNG economy released on 2 december 2014 
(these are difficult to collate from PNG sources).1  
The adjustments in the analysis are kept to 
simple first-round effects without including any 
price elasticities or changes in other variables 
(such as exchange rates). Only one adjustment is 
made: lNG/oil prices are reduced, generally by 30 
per cent. Assumptions are made explicit through 
this brief and in the accompanying spreadsheets. 
The imf, BPNG and Treasury would have more 
information to undertake more detailed analysis 
– but this would not change the fundamental 
story below. The 30 per cent reduction is based 
on a conservative application of the gap that 
now exists between the oil price forecast at the 
time of the 2015 budget and current prices. lNG 
prices are directly linked to oil prices (through the 
Japanese Crude Cocktail)2 so the reduction in lNG 
prices will be similar. 
figure 1 indicates the rapid slide in oil prices 
over the last six months of more than 35 per 
cent. At the time of preparing the assumptions 
for the 2015 PNG budget (around early October), 
a forecast of $US89.70 a barrel for 2015 would 
have looked reasonable as oil prices had only 
just dropped below that level. from that time, oil 
prices have fallen by a third. market estimates 
are that the oil price will recover but only very 
slowly – and by the end of 2019 they would still 
be nearly 30 per cent lower than PNG Treasury 
forecasts. This price drop in a key commodity 
(LNG/oil) is a classic example of what economists 
call an “external shock”.
1  Unfortunately, the imf’s report was not considered by its ex-
ecutive Board (it was adopted through a time lapse procedure). 
Australia and other friends of PNG should have worked towards 
such Board consideration as the experience of other countries could 
have been shared. 
2  This is stated on page 5 of the 2012 IMF Article IV report on PNG: 
“The annual output of 6.6 million tons is fully contracted to buyers 
from Japan, mainland china and Taiwan Poc. The lNG price is 
linked to the oil price (Japan Crude Cocktail).”
3B U d G e T A r y  i m P A c T 
Unfortunately, the 2015 budget removed all fiscal 
space for a response to the fiscal crisis created 
by the fall in lNG prices. As noted in my earlier 
blog post, the actual 2015 budget figures were 
neither credible nor appropriate, and that was 
before the fall in oil prices of more than 35 per 
cent from the estimates included in the 2015 
PNG budget. It is difficult to determine exactly 
how the consequent reduction in lNG prices 
will flow into declines in PNG revenues. This is 
because tax payments and dividends depend on 
profits, so some allowance has to be made for 
operating, capital and depreciation costs. These 
details are difficult to obtain so are inferred 
from the implied tax base from the original 
budget figures. A second problem is the loss of 
transparency. The 2015 budget moved around 
K3.3 billion of mining and petroleum revenues 
off-budget with no information. With the fall in 
profits, and thus dividends, it is possible that 
even more will need to be taken from the budget, 
especially if off-budget costs such as the UBS loan 
for the oil Search shares still have to be funded. 
finally, there is a need to relate the large increase 
between 2014 and 2015 in mining and petroleum 
taxes to the lNG project. it is assumed that taxes 
on existing petroleum fields remain at their 
current estimated level of around K200 million 
per annum, so that the budgeted increase in 
mining and petroleum taxes is due to lNG taxes. 
This is conservative, as profits from other mines 
may also fall.3  
enough with assumptions, what are the 
implications? What was already a very difficult 
situation will become significantly worse. Revenue 
losses of K1,403 million in 2015 and K1,461 
million in 2016 are expected relative to the 2015 
budget. There would be additional substantial 
losses on the value of lNG dividends that have 
been taken off-budget. These have not been 
included in this analysis but are estimated at a 
further K350 million on top of other impacts, such 
as the oil Search shares now being worth some 
K600 million less than when purchased. 
 
3  The fall in other PNG lNG project revenues, such as a fall in 
royalty payments to landowner groups, are not covered in this 
analysis. As these are linked to well-head value, the reductions will 
generally be close to the fall in lNG and oil prices – so around 30 per 
cent.
Figure 1: Oil prices – market prices, futures and PNG forecasts
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4Based on 2015 budget figures, the PNG 
LNG project had an implied profit rate after 
depreciation and other costs of 26 per cent in 
2015 and 28 per cent in 2016. These were pretty 
healthy profit ratios – but they disappear with the 
30 per cent fall in gross revenues. The net effect 
is that there will be no taxable profits for the PNG 
lNG project for up to 10 years until depreciation 
allowances end. dividends to shareholders 
will be less affected as they are paid from cash 
flows (and don’t need to include the significant 
depreciation costs over the first ten years of 
the project) – so dividends are only expected to 
decline by 60 per cent (based on a 50 per cent 
profit-to-gross revenue ratio and a 30 per cent 
decline in gross returns).
As shown in figure 2 below, government 
resource revenues have been volatile in PNG. 
There were boom years from 2005 to 2007. After 
the global financial crisis, resource revenues 
returned to healthy levels in 2010 and 2011. 
There was known to be a likely gap between the 
end of the good pit reserves in the ok Tedi mine 
and the commencement of the PNG lNG project. 
The 2014 budget painted a rosy picture of 
expected revenues from the lNG project. By the 
2015 budget, a significant part of these returns, 
especially LNG dividends, were moved off-
budget (presumably held in the proposed Kumul 
Holdings). These funds amounted to K3.3 billion 
between 2016 and 2018. The bottom line on the 
right is the estimate of resource revenues after 
the 30 per cent fall in lNG/oil prices. revenues 
return to the levels of the late 1990s and early 
2000s when PNG faced another major drop in 
commodity prices. 
What does this mean in aggregate? figure 3 
shows that, after allowing for inflation, by 2016, 
total PNG revenues are now expected to be 
slightly below K10 billion, more than K2 billion 
less than forecast only 13 months ago (in nominal 
terms, the actual fall is K2.5 billion). Through to 
2018, including only the direct budget impacts, 
revenues will be some K5.6 billion less than 
Figure 2: Resource revenues over time
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5forecast due to the fall in lNG/oil prices over the 
last three months. This requires urgent reworking 
of the 2015 budget to ensure that fiscal policy 
is put on a reasonable setting given new world 
prices for PNG’s key export. The idea that there 
is a resource boom and ample new revenues to 
be spent no longer holds. With no real growth 
in revenue now forecast from 2014 out to 2018, 
expenditure must be brought under control and 
the recommendations of the tax review urgently 
considered. fiscal adjustment will not be easy 
with growing interest payments and a growing 
population, but the recent strong growth in 
expenditure gives room for manoeuvre.
Table 1 shows the impact of the oil price shock 
on the bottom line of the budget. The baseline 
for this analysis is the 2015 budget, but adjusted 
to comply with imf 2001 guidelines, as explained 
in my earlier blog post. Also as per that blog, we 
consider a more realistic expenditure outlook 
under which expenditure rises by 10 per cent a 
year in nominal terms, rather than being savagely 
cut in the outer years as per the 2015 budget. for 
both scenarios (budget and realistic) the impact 
of the oil shock is shown. 
if budget assumptions are otherwise complied 
with, the 2015 deficit will be 8.8 per cent rather 
than the budgeted 5.3 per cent, and the debt-to-
GdP ratio no longer falls below the legal cap of 
30 per cent. Things are much worse under the 
“realistic” scenario without expenditure cuts, with 
the deficit reaching as high as 14 per cent of GDP 
and debt as high as 75 per cent of GdP, more 
than twice the legal limit. 
Figure 3: Impact of oil price shock on total PNG government revenues (2014 prices)
Table 1: Deficit and debt as a result of the oil shock under two different scenarios (% GDP)
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2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Deficit (% GDP)
2015 budget 6.7% 8.0% 5.3% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
2015 budget with oil shock 6.7% 8.1% 8.8% 5.6% 2.2% 1.9% 1.7%
2015 budget “realistic” 6.7% 8.0% 5.3% 7.7% 9.3% 10.6% 11.6%
2015 budget “realistic” with oil shock 6.7% 8.1% 8.8% 11.3% 12.3% 13.2% 14.0%
Debt (% GDP)
2015 budget 34.6% 35.5% 27.8% 28.0% 26.6% 25.2% 23.6%
2015 budget with oil shock 34.6% 36.0% 33.5% 36.2% 36.3% 35.9% 35.1%
2015 budget “realistic” 34.6% 35.5% 31.6% 36.6% 44.2% 52.4% 60.6%
2015 budget “realistic” with oil shock 34.6% 36.0% 37.5% 45.6% 55.2% 65.0% 74.5%
Note: All figures as per 2001 IMF guidelines. The “realistic” scenario allows 10% nominal growth in the outer years.  
For more details, see this blog.
6i m P A c T  o N  P N G ’ S  G r o W T h  r A T e
The change in the value of PNG’s major new 
export inevitably also affects the measured size 
of the economy or GdP. This can be calculated 
by reducing the value of oil and gas extraction 
shown in the GDP table (Table 1) in Volume 1 of 
the 2015 budget documents. reducing the level 
by 10 per cent in 2014 (as the fall in oil prices 
occurred late in 2014) and by 30 per cent in 2015 
leads to revised growth forecasts of 7.0 per cent 
in 2014 and 6.9 per cent in 2015, down from 8.4 
per cent and 15.5 per cent respectively. These 
falls are built into the analysis above. The PNG 
lNG project is extremely important for PNG. 
however, its importance has been diminished by 
the new commodity price outlook.
i m P A c T  o N  B A l A N c e  o f  P A y m e N T S 
A N D  I N T e R N A T I O N A L  R e S e R V e S
Table 3 of the IMF’s recent 2014 Article IV report 
provides some detail on PNG’s balance of 
payments. The conventional view is that PNG lNG 
exports would have returned the overall balance 
of payments to a surplus. This would have 
meant international reserves would have started 
increasing again. PNG lNG exports appear to 
account for around 50 per cent of the forecast 
$US10 billion in PNG’s resource exports in 2015. 
The net effect of the assumed 30 per cent fall in 
lNG prices is to reduce the value of total exports 
by around 15 per cent. The impact of this is 
shown in the graph below.
The very top line shows the original forecast 
for an increase in PNG’s net international 
reserves from $US2,427 million in 2014 to 
$US3,845 million by 2016. Allowing for the fall in 
oil prices, net international reserves are expected 
to fall to $US2,049 million in 2015, covering just 
over 3 months of imports of goods and services. 
reserves would keep falling below this critical 
level and PNG would be out of foreign exchange 
by early 2017. This is because the original 
forecast had the overall balance of payments 
with large surpluses in 2015 and 2016. This would 
no longer be the case with lower oil prices, as 
is shown by the lower two lines. clearly, given 
the need to have some level of import cover, 
something has to happen soon. otherwise, 
PNG will be going to the imf or another country 
seeking a large bail out.
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Figure 4: Impact of oil price shock on overall BoP balance and net international reserves
7P N G ’ S  e x c h A N G e  r A T e
A commodity exporter such as PNG can use the 
exchange rate as a buffer to deal with sudden 
drops in mineral prices. indeed, a market based 
exchange rate can be more important for dealing 
with volatility in resource prices than a sovereign 
wealth fund. other commodity exporters are 
allowing their exchange rates fall relative to the 
US dollar to deal with price falls. As noted in an 
earlier blog, PNG moved away from a market 
based exchange rate on 4 June 2014. This had 
significant impacts on poor exporters in PNG: 
the earlier blog argued the change would have 
moved 130,000 coffee growers in the highlands 
to below the poverty line, with a major drop in 
income for all 2.1 million coffee growers as well 
as other small-scale producers. The value of 
the Kina against the US dollar has fallen slowly 
since the sudden appreciation on 4 June, and the 
appreciation from 4 June to 11 december is now 
around 11 per cent. however, figure 5 below 
shows that, because the value of the Australian 
dollar has started depreciating against the US 
dollar (as expected for a commodity producer), 
the Kina has appreciated against the Australian 
dollar by over 22 per cent since 4 June, and is 
above its level from 12 months ago. This makes 
no economic sense unless payments against 
major loans in US dollars are being protected. 
With the fall in lNG prices, the exchange rate 
must move back to a market basis. it is one of 
the few tools available to deal with the growing 
shortage of foreign exchange. Unless the 
exchange rate is allowed to depreciated then, as 
shown above, international reserves will drop 
below three months of imports in just over  
12 months.
Figure 5: Kina exchange rate over the last 12 months
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8c o N c l U S i o N
The PNG lNG project has often been thought of 
as transformative for PNG. But just at the time 
the country was to benefit from the revenue and 
foreign exchange flows from this major project, 
international markets have dealt a cruel blow. 
The decline in oil and LNG prices also significantly 
reduces the viability of other lNG projects in 
the pipeline. With good policies, adjustments 
could be made to deal with such a drop in prices. 
however, PNG has moved to poor policies over 
the last six months such as moving away from 
a market based exchange rate, starting to print 
money to fund the deficit (as argued here), and 
deciding on an unsustainable fiscal policy in the 
2015 budget. This means that to avoid a crisis the 
required adjustment is all the more painful.
There should be a public debate about 
the necessary actions to adjust. Some of the 
key measures needed were set out in the 
introduction. To recap:
• At the end of its financial year for 2014, 
the PNG government should not spend 
any extra money, but instead pocket any 
savings from unspent allocations. 
• in face of such a large shock, the 2015 
budget needs to be rewritten to avoid a 
spiralling deficit. 
• PNG also needs to move back to a market-
based, floating exchange rate to provide a 
“shock absorber” for the economy, and find 
better ways to fund the deficit than printing 
money.
PNG had set itself on a slippery slope towards 
a crisis, and the world just gave it a great big 
shove. Good public policy making in PNG just 
became much harder – but also more important.
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